# Donor-Induced Democratization and the Privatization of State Violence in Kenya and Rwanda

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Since the end of the cold war, the proliferation of violent irregular units, including militias, paramilitaries, vigilantes, and warlords, has been widely discussed.[1] Many claim that this phenomenon is a consequence of the "wresting" of the monopoly of violence out of the hands of the state by violent groups and communities and signifies a "coming anarchy."[2] They see the formation of violent nonstate actors as a by-product of state breakdown. Martin Van Creveld declared at the end of the cold war: "As the second millennium A.D. is coming to an end, the state's attempt to monopolize violence in its own hands is faltering."[3] Though this pessimistic outlook may be warranted, it is too one-sided. It fails to take into account the actions and intervention of the state. Whereas irregular forces are rapaciously eating away at the state's monopoly of violence, the state is also willingly giving it away. States are sponsoring violent "irregulars" to carry out repressive activities—what can be called privatized state violence.

Why would the state invite and sanction irregular forces to use violence within its borders and compromise its ultimate control of coercion?[4] Particularly in Africa, where states never completely established a monopoly over the use of force, it seems paradoxical for a government to risk further undermining its own authority by creating militias and inciting ethnic violence. [5] The relationship between donor-induced democratization and the rise of militias and state-sponsored ethnic violence can help explain this apparent contradiction in Africa.[6]

External donor pressure had interactive and mediating effects on domestic politics in African states in the early 1990s. By itself, international pressure did not lead to democratization or privatized state violence. Instead, when political conditionalities converged and interacted with domestic political threats (for example, massive opposition protests and rebel insurgencies), it caused some governments, particularly those that had previously politicized ethnicity and mobilized groups along ethnic lines, to privatize their coercive strategies. Incumbents are rational actors, whose sole goal is to stay in power, but their preferences and behavior are shaped and constrained by international and domestic structures. Analysis of incumbents' repressive policies in Kenya, Rwanda, and Malawi shows that democratization and external pressure altered state coercive strategies, leading the incumbents intentionally to compromise their monopoly of violence as a means of neutralizing the opposition threat.

**"New Wars" and Evolving Repressive Strategies**

With the end of the cold war much attention has been given to the phenomena of state failure, ethnic conflict, and civil war. Some have gone so far as to identify these recent conflicts as "new wars"—a combination of war, organized crime, and large-scale human rights violations.[7] Van Creveld and Kaplan argue that this trend of "new" violence is the result of the weakening of the state and the formation of private predatory units.[8] Mueller concurs. "Moreover, if some states (like Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Rwanda) came to depend on irregulars, it is not because they find this approach preferable, but because they are unable to muster an adequate number of recruits to field a real army."[9] These authors speculate that the erosion of the state's monopoly of violence, due to shrinking national budgets and the decay of armed forces, will lead to "worldwide low-intensity conflict" as the line between public and private violence disappears. [10]

Despite their perceptiveness in documenting this recent type of violence, authors of "new wars" studies are overly deterministic. They gloss over the role of the state and only briefly hint that central governments may be intentionally compromising their monopoly of violence for tactical purposes. Though surely the structural constraints of weak states contribute to their propensity to rely on irregulars and militias, a structural argument does not explain the specific conditions under which states will turn to this strategy. Not all weak states sponsor irregulars to counter political challengers.

A second group of studies focuses on the interaction between external factors and domestic repression. Studies in this domain examine how foreign governments, international institutions, and nongovernmental organizations apply normative and material pressure on states to reduce repression and political violence. [11] Naturally, these studies have focused on the positive consequences of international pressure—forcing states to reduce human rights violations or, at worst, having no effect.[12] External pressure, however, does not always have a constructive influence on a state's repressive policies. External stimulus for change can lead to a "distancing" of human rights abuses, in which states, under international pressure to end repressive practices, privatize state violence (that is, sponsor nonstate agents to carry out repressive activities for the state), leading to more, not fewer, human rights violations.

The interaction between external stimuli and domestic politics in Africa can clearly identify the mechanism by which political conditionalities affect domestic repression. Central to the thesis is the nexus between democratization, political conditionalities, and a regime's coercive strategy. [13] It is important, first, to specify clearly the conceptualization of privatized state violence.

## Privatized State Violence

A regime's coercive repertoire lies on a continuum from legal and legitimate (for example, neighborhood policing) to illegal and illegitimate (for example, genocide and politicide).[14] State violence, which falls into the illegal and illegitimate realm, is an abuse of power that occurs when the state employs coercion to regulate opposition to its authority and policies.[15] Privatized state violence, a subset of state violence, is coercion orchestrated by the state against real or perceived opponents but carried out by nonstate actors, such as vigilantes, paramilitaries, and militias, who are directly or indirectly supported by the government. [16] The role of the government differentiates privatized state violence from violence perpetrated by private organizations (for example, anticrime vigilantes, self-defense units, and ethnic militias) that act on their own volition. In other words, when documenting privatized state violence, there must be evidence that the state supports (provides weapons, personnel, logistics, and intelligence), sponsors (finances), or permits (refuses to quell) the repressive activities of these informal groups for political gain.

The privatization of state violence is not a new phenomenon. It did not suddenly emerge with the end of the cold war. It has been used throughout history by states wishing to counter domestic opponents violently, while concealing their involvement for domestic or international purposes. New to the post-cold-war era, however, is donor-induced democratization, in which the international community, recognizing widespread domestic support for democratic reforms, stringently pressures intransigent rulers to embrace democratization or risk losing vital foreign aid. This study demonstrates how the internal demands of democratization and the external demands of political conditionalities caused Rwanda and Kenya to choose privatized state violence as their predominant repressive strategy.

## Theoretical Framework

To address the question how donor-induced democratization affects a state's coercive strategy, a rational choice approach will be employed to explain the incumbents' policies. African incumbents are taken as rational actors striving to maximize their advantage and maintain their "privileged position" over the opposition by expanding resources and neutralizing political challengers. [17] However, the incumbents' calculus in deciding which methods to employ to maintain their preeminence over the opposition or how they go about expanding resources and neutralizing political challengers is constrained and configured by the nature of the oppositional threat, domestic political institutions, and interaction with the international donors. In the early 1990s the transition to democratization and the end of the cold war forced incumbents to alter their strategies in resource generation and political control.

The end of the cold war altered the nature of foreign aid and official development assistance to African states. No longer motivated by cold war politics, bilateral donors substantially reduced ties with former client states and imposed conditionalities on the aid they distributed to African countries. The United States, France, the United Kingdom, the European Community, and Japan all publicly declared that future aid disbursements to Africa would be linked to respect for human rights, democratization, and good governance.[18]

In the early 1990s twenty-five of forty-seven African countries experienced some type of donor pressure in the form of explicit political conditions for aid or loans.[19] Correlated with a state's repression of legitimate political challengers, political conditionalities were placed on regimes that relied on abusive policies to counter opposition groups and resisted democratic reforms. [20] Political conditionalities, however, had the opposite effect of what donors expected.[21] Rather than persuade repressive regimes to open their political systems, external pressure increased the demands on incumbents, heightening their sense of vulnerability, while empowering opposition challengers. In short, political conditionalities acted as another threat to the long-time autocrats' hold on power and provoked repressive responses.

Donor pressure coupled with explicit political demands in the form of active oppositional resistance caused incumbent regimes to redouble their repressive efforts. As Table 1 illustrates, neither external pressure nor domestic protest by itself was suffi-

**Table 1** Proportion of African Countries That Employ Systematic Repression under Varying Levels of International and Domestic Pressure for Democratization in the Early 1990s[1]

| | | Domestic Pressure: Low | Domestic Pressure: High |
|---|---|---|---|
| International Pressure: Low | | 0 out of 5 employ systematic repression | 3 out of 12 |
| International Pressure: High | | 0 out of 9 | 9 out of 16 |

[1] Sample includes all sub-Saharan African countries except the five (Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal, and Zimbabwe) that had multiparty regimes prior to the end of the cold war. Cross-tabulation analysis completed using data and variables from Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Political Regimes and Regime Transitions in Africa, 1910-1994*, dataset and codebook. Domestic pressure is measured by level of political protest between 1988 and 1992. Protest variable (PROTEST) is collapsed into high (scores of 1 and 2, some or frequent protest, respectively) and low (score of 0, no protest). International pressure is measured by level of explicit political conditions for foreign aid. International Pressure (INTLPR) is collapsed into high (scores of 1 and 2, some and explicit political conditionalities, respectively) and low (score of 0, no international pressure for democratization and good governance). Repression (REPRESS) is dichotomous: either a regime employs systematic violence against opposition leaders (coded 1) or it does not (coded 0).

cient to induce systematic repression. When domestic and external demands for democracy converged, however, a majority of African incumbents responded by increasing repressive activities. That regimes experiencing both domestic protest and donor conditionalities were the most likely to turn to repression is not surprising. To beget resistance and international sanctions in the first place required a degree of political intransigence by the incumbent, proportionate to the leader's commitment to holding on to power. As threats increased (particularly explicit threats in the form of protests and insurgencies that convinced the incumbent that his hold on power was directly challenged), the ruler responded with systematic repression, even if it required persistent violent confrontation with political challengers.

As neopatrimonial autocrats intensified their repressive activities in response to simultaneous external and domestic political demands, some discovered that their tried and true methods of repression—targeting urban protesters and feisty opposition leaders—were insufficient in neutralizing the popular threat to their regimes. Unlike in the past, repression did not quell opposition protest, but reinforced it.[22] Furthermore, with multipartyism the new game in town, the range of political challengers was broadened to include entire opposition communities and ethnic groups that had the potential to vote the incumbent out of office in the first round of post-cold-war elections. [23] Thus, how to neutralize the empowered and emboldened electorate posed a challenge to unpopular African despots.

International pressure, however, continued to constrain state behavior and structured repressive responses. Blocking the democratization process was impossible in highly dependent regimes like Kenya and Malawi, where the resumption of foreign aid flows was contingent upon the holding of multiparty elections. Similarly, brutal tactics and massive human rights abuses engendered the suspension of foreign aid and international sanctions at a much lower threshold than during the cold war. Faced with this dilemma, some African leaders privatized repression as a way of containing the broad popular challenge to their government, while attempting to distance themselves from the human rights abuses. Militias, vigilantes, and armed youth wings that could form quickly and ubiquitously but act inconspicuously proved to be the perfect antidote to this omnipresent opposition population during a heavily scrutinized democratic transition.

It is important to note, however, that not all leaders who faced dual domestic and international pressure privatized state violence. To explain why some rulers faced with internal and external demands for democratization privatized violence, while others did not, it becomes important to look at characteristics of the regime itself, rather than focus solely on the incentives and pressures on the regime. External stimuli and oppositional demands produce different policy responses from states depending on the regime's characteristics, institutions, and domestic politics (for example, state-societal relations).[24] The degree of previous politicization and militarization of ethnicity tends to separate those states that pursued a strategy of privatized state vio-

lence from those that did not.[25] Leaders who had formerly mobilized and militarized ethnic identity to consolidate political control, often favoring their ethnic groups at the expense of others and stacking the military with ethnic kin, found it easier to privatize state violence and incite communal conflict to neutralize political challengers. In contrast, in those countries where the leaders did not manipulate ethnicity for political purposes and there were few sharp ethnic cleavages, there was less likelihood of government-sponsored ethnic conflict or the privatization of state violence because of the difficulty of mobilizing groups for these purposes.

In sum, as portrayed in Figure 1, the end of the cold war led to a change in the character of international pressure. Foreign donors tied external assistance to respect for human rights and democratization. At the same time, democratization changed the nature of the oppositional threat; political opponents were not only more committed, due to the implicit support of the international community and the diffusion of democratic sentiment, but also were much broader in scope, including entire oppositional communities and ethnic groups. Faced with this converging domestic and international pressure, the incumbents realized that conventional repression was more costly (because of potential loss of foreign assistance) and less effective (because of an empowered electorate and committed oppositional groups). Thus, calculating the high costs and ineffectiveness of relying on overt repressive tactics, some incumbents, particularly those who had in the past mobilized groups along ethnic lines and thus could easily incite ethnic violence and create militias, altered their coercive strategies and privatized state violence.

## The Privatization of Repression in East Africa

**Kenya** By the end of the cold war Kenya's president Daniel Arap Moi had been in power for more than a decade. His government maintained control through patronage networks and political repression. In 1982 Moi established the Kenya Africa

**Figure 1** Path to Privatized State Violence



National Union (KANU) as the sole legal political party, and the office of the president assumed ultimate power. Opposition movements were crushed, and political dissidents were detained, tortured, and killed. Though Moi wished to diminish the role of ethnicity in politics (for example, by disbanding tribal associations in 1980), he sharpened ethnic cleavages as he shifted government patronage from Kikuyu, the ethnic group of Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, to the Kalenjin, his own ethnic group, and other smaller ones. [26] After a 1982 coup attempt Moi stacked the army with Kalenjin and strengthened the General Services Unit, an elite internal security force, while pursuing divide-and-rule tactics against the Kikuyu and Luo. [27]

By the late 1980s, however, the winds of change were blowing through Africa. In August 1991 political opponents of the government formed an umbrella alliance, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), to challenge Moi's monopoly of power. Shrewdly, the opposition leaders sought to establish transnational links with groups in key foreign countries to increase their contacts with the international donors, to bolster their bargaining position, and to reduce the risk of protest activities.[28]

By 1991 the international community, especially the U.S., started to weigh in and threatened to terminate Kenya's aid if it did not open its political system and improve its human rights record. The U.S. Congress passed the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, making $15 million in economic and military aid contingent upon Kenya's curbing of human rights abuses and corruption. The U.S. ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone, became a strong proponent of democracy and a vociferous critic of Moi's government. Hempstone persuaded the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to link foreign aid disbursement to democratization.[29]

Despite the external conditionalities, Moi continued business as usual. In early October 1991 a political rally calling for multipartyism was banned by the government, and more than three hundred people were arrested preemptively. Less than six weeks later, the government arrested the country's first vice president, Oginga Odinga, and other leaders of the FORD alliance for planning to hold a demonstration in support of democracy. These highly publicized human rights violations spurred the Consultative Group for Kenya, a consortium of international donors that met shortly after the key opposition leaders were arrested, to suspend $1 billion in annual foreign aid until the Kenyan government introduced political and economic reforms.[30] In a communiqué issued after the Consultative Group meeting, the international donors "underlined the importance of the rule of law and respect for human rights" and declared that "[l]evels of aid for Kenya depend on clear progress in implementing economic and social reform."[31]

Highly dependent upon external assistance, Moi's regime swiftly responded to the donors' demands and embraced political reforms. [32] In December 1991, only one month after the suspension of donor assistance, the government lifted a ban on oppo-

sition political parties and legalized multipartyism despite President Moi's repeated warnings that democracy would descend the country into ethnic violence. A year later Kenya held its first multiparty election since 1966. The period preceding the election, however, proved to be bloody.

Ethnic clashes originated in the Rift Valley Province and other parts of western Kenya as early as October 1991. Though the government asserted the violence was spontaneous, a deeper look reveals that it was incited by members of the Kalenjin and Maasai ethnic groups, including elites close to Moi, such as a vice president and KANU members of parliament, who feared democracy would undercut their privileged status and favor larger ethnic groups, like the Kikuyu and the Luo, who supported the FORD opposition alliance.[33] These KANU politicians demanded *majimboism*, or an ethnic-based federal structure, which was first introduced by Kalenjin and Maasai leaders at the time of independence to counter efforts by Kenyatta to create a centralized new government. Using similar apocalyptic language as their forbears to describe the fate of smaller ethnic groups in a democratic political system, Kalenjin politicians rallied their troops ready for battle. They claimed the Rift Valley as their "traditional homeland" and publicly vowed to keep "foreigners" (that is, Kikuyu) out of the province.

The Moi regime's legacy of political exclusion of Kikuyu and Luo, in favor of Kalenjin and other smaller ethnic groups, ensured that militias were easily mobilized along ethnic lines. Violent irregular units, called "Kalenjin warriors," were responsible for carrying out the attacks and instigating the ethnic violence. Their motives were clearly political: to disrupt and disenfranchise pro-opposition communities, reward KANU and Moi supporters with lucrative land plots, and deter individuals from joining the opposition parties.[34] The public security forces, which were accused of disproportionately promoting and favoring Kalenjin officers, guaranteed Moi their loyalty during the transition to multipartyism, and thus failed to intervene to stop the ethnic violence.[35] In some instances, the security forces supported the Kalenjin warriors.[36]

The violence by the Kalenjin warriors was concentrated in the Rift Valley Province around Kikuyu-settled areas. The Kalenjin elites hoped that their control of the Rift Valley would not only guarantee that Moi received more than twenty-five percent of the presidential vote in that province, but also ensure they won the largest number of seats in parliament.[37] Therefore, even in case of an opposition presidential victory, members of the Kalenjin ethnic group would continue their political control of the powerful Rift Valley region.

As the violence continued, it spread to other parts of the country. Violent irregulars attacked opposition strongholds in the Western Province near the Uganda border in an effort to disenfranchise pro-opposition ethnic blocs there, too.[38] Similar violence erupted in Nyanza Province, the home area of the Luo and the opposition

leader Oginga Odinga, even though there was no history of ethnic clashes between the Luo and Kalenjin.[39]

Over 1,500 people were killed, and 300,000 people were displaced.[40] The government-sponsored political disorder and the skilful use of patronage strained the tenuous opposition coalition. Less than five months before the election, the FORD party fragmented due to elite infighting.

Moi won the election with only 36.35 percent of the total vote. Despite the widespread violence and displacement, the election was legitimized by an observer group from the Commonwealth, who declared that the elections "directly reflect, however imperfectly, the expression of the will of the people."[41] Less than four months after the election, with the violence in the Rift Valley still flaring up, donors, according to the *Economist*, considered Moi's "effort at political reform adequate."[42] By the end of 1993 western donors promised to resume foreign assistance the following year in the amount of $800 million in balance-of-payments support. Meanwhile, in the towns of Naivasha, Nakuru, and Eldoret irregulars continued to attack Kikuyu, who had voted for opposition MPs in the 1992 election.[43]

In Kenya, Moi's regime tried to weaken the democratically empowered opposition by sponsoring armed irregular units to attack Luo, Luhya, and Kikuyu communities, the ethnic groups that comprised the dominant opposition political parities. Wary of the signals massive human rights abuses would send to the international donor community, the regime publicly distanced itself from the violence by portraying the "ethnic clashes" as "solely based on a land dispute" or blamed the opposition "tribalists" for instigating the violence and "provoking civil war."[44] Though indigenous and international human rights groups documented the Kenyan government's responsibility in inciting the internal conflict, the regime sufficiently clouded the causes of the violence to ensure that within a year of the election the international donors were once again opening their coffers. [45] A similar strategy was evident in Rwanda in the early 1990s as that government felt external pressure to implement political reforms and end single party rule.

**Rwanda** As in Kenya, the end of the cold war led to a simultaneous increase in international and domestic pressure on the Rwandan government to democratize. In 1990 the president of France, François Mitterrand, delivered his famous speech at the Summit of La Baule, in which he declared that economic aid to African countries, including Rwanda, would be linked to democratization. That same year the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a rebel movement based in neighboring Uganda that upheld the lack of democracy as one of its primary grievances, launched an attack on Rwandan soil. Responding to these demands, Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana in June 1991 adopted a new constitution, which legalized opposition political parties and created a post of prime minister. This constitution ended the sixteen year domination of Habyarimana's party, the National Revolutionary Movement

for Development (*Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement*, MRND), as the sole political party in the country.

Oppositional protest persisted, however, when Habyarimana appointed an MRND leader to be prime minister in late 1991. The government countered this political resistance by resorting to coercion. The regime conducted a wave of arrests of political opponents (as many as 8,000 people by one estimate) between October 1990 and April 1991. The arrests did little good in cooling the opposition's fervor; instead, they reinforced it and provoked strong international criticism.[46] Recognizing the limitations of conventional forms of repression (such as arresting opposition leaders and targeting urban protesters), the MRND established a youth wing to attack opposition parties and disrupt their political rallies.

To mobilize the youth wing, a radical group of elites that advocated Hutu Power exploited extant ethnic cleavages between Tutsi and Hutu, which were reinforced by years of institutionalized discrimination against the Tutsi, and rallied resentment against the Tutsi, who were accused of aiding the Ugandan-based RPF and supporting the political opposition. [47] By 1992 the youth group increased dramatically in membership (drawing primarily from the large unemployed youth population in the country), transformed itself into a militia movement, known as the Interahamwe, and broadened its targets from rival political parties to the *ibyitso*, or "accomplices of the enemy," including all the Tutsi and Hutu who opposed Rwanda's president, Juvenal Habyarimana.[48] Though high-level officials attempted to deny the existence of the Interahamwe or mask its function, it became evident that the Rwandan government created, organized, trained, financed, armed, and directed the militia movement. [49] As in Kenya, the Rwandan armed forces, dominated by Hutu extremists and regime loyalists, did not act to quell the privatized state violence, but abetted it.[50] The incitement of communal violence and the employment of irregulars—the "organization of chaos"—allowed the Rwandan government to blame the rising levels of insecurity in the country on the transition to multipartyism.[51]

As the international community pressured Rwanda to continue its transition from single party rule to multiparty politics and more strenuously pressed the government to negotiate with the RPF rebels, Habyarimana recognized that large amounts of international aid could be jeopardized if the Rwandan government engaged in official, overt violence against opposition groups or was pinpointed as the obstacle to a political solution with the insurgents. Nevertheless, the Rwandan president perceived these opposition groups as credible threats to his political power and felt he must continue violently to attack and intimidate their political base to keep them off balance. As the RPF increased attacks on Rwandan soil and the rebels started to recruit Tutsi living in Rwanda, Hutu extremists within the regime began to perceive the whole Tutsi population inside the country as potential fifth columnists.[52] Consequently, Habyarimana's regime repeatedly turned to the Interahamwe to counter brutally political challengers and the Tutsi population. In March 1992, in the

first act of violence by the Interahamwe, the militia slaughtered a large number of Tutsi at Bugesera. With this massacre the Rwandan government discovered the expediency of employing violent irregulars like the Interahamwe, while official state forces remained quiet in public view of foreign diplomats.

As the civil war continued, Habyarimana's hold on power became more tenuous, and the RPF gained several significant military victories, including a massive offensive that doubled its territorial control in February 1993.[53] In July 1993 the international community, including France and the World Bank, issued an ultimatum to Habyarimana's regime, threatening to suspend all foreign aid if it did not sign a peace treaty with the RPF by August 9.[54] On August 4, 1993, Habyarimana's government, the RPF, and other opposition parties signed a peace agreement in Arusha, Tanzania. The agreement excluded extremists who asserted Hutu Power.[55] Thus, to maintain the tactical upper hand and frustrate the implementation of the Arusha agreement, hardliners in Habyarimana's regime intensified incitement of ethnic violence against Tutsi.[56] Depicting the violence as "popular" acts beyond its control, the Rwandan government insulated itself from culpability and maintained a constant stream of foreign aid.[57]

Alison des Forges, a consultant for Human Rights Watch, describes how Rwandan officials portrayed the wide disconnection between the state and the irregular militia groups.

> Well aware of how easily foreigners accepted explanations of "ancient, tribal hatreds," the authorities repeatedly underlined the "tribal" nature of the killings when called to account by the international community. They insisted that they had been simply unable to control the outburst of spontaneous, popular rage. Then, turning the explanation into a plea for additional foreign support, they would express regrets that the government was so poor that it could not provide officials with the needed resources to keep order in such difficult circumstances.[58]

Rwanda, like Kenya, recognized that militias and irregular armed units could operate for the state under the cloak of "tribal warfare." In 1994 these private units were used to carry out genocide that killed more than 800,000 people in one hundred days. Aware that western governments "accepted" a certain level of ethnic violence in the region, the Rwandan government manipulated this expectation to maximize its suppression of the perceived threat from the Tutsi and moderate Hutu population, while ensuring a steady flow of resources in the early part of the 1990s.

## Striving to Increase Resources and Immobilize the Opposition in the Post-Cold-War Era

The Kenyan and Rwanda cases show how donor-induced democratization transformed the incumbents' perceptions of the political enemy. In Kenya under multipar-

tyism the main threat to Moi's regime was no longer specific opposition political leaders (for example, Oginga Odinga and Kenneth Matiba), but entire opposition populations and ethnic groups (for example, Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya) who would vote against Moi in any democratic election. Dispersed throughout the country, the FORD supporters could not be easily disenfranchised and suppressed. Similarly in Rwanda, simultaneous rebel activity and calls for democratization heightened the fear and paranoia of Habyarimana's regime, especially the extremist Hutu Power element. The regime felt it was losing its grip on power and broadened its perception of the political adversary to include all Tutsis and many moderate Hutu, who were identified as *ibyitso*, or accomplices of the enemy.

Predisposed to using repressive means to counter domestic threats and to mobilizing ethnic identity for political gain, the Rwandan and Kenyan governments communalized repression by sponsoring militias. These militias could quickly sprout up throughout the countryside and inconspicuously carry out violence that would consume whole adversarial regions and communities. In short, privatizing repression counteracted the democratic dispersion of power throughout the country.

At the same time, the privatization of violence allowed the incumbents to exploit the international community's aversion to instability and state failure. As Christopher Clapham writes, "in arbitrating between the demands of greater participation on the one hand, and the maintenance of authority on the other, the instincts of Western governments generally favored authority, especially if democracy appeared to be leading to the recrudescence of ethnic conflict and the possibility of state collapse."[59] In Rwanda the donor community played right into the hands of Habyarimana's regime; the Rwandan government secured an increase in foreign assistance in the early 1990s as the donors feared that the ethnic violence might spill out of control and destabilize the region.[60]

## Limits to the Thesis: Comparing across Africa

Rwanda and Kenya are only two examples in which political conditionalities and democratization caused the privatization of violence. There are other African countries where incumbent leaders faced with converging external and internal demands for democratization incited violence to counter opposition challengers. Similarly to Rwanda and Kenya, in these countries leaders had previously rallied political support along ethnic or racial lines. Thus, when a grass-roots threat emerged, incumbents could easily mobilize militias and incite ethnic violence to counter the political challengers. In South Africa the government permitted political violence between the black opposition parties, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha, as domestic resistance increased and the international community pressured Pretoria to

open its political system and end apartheid.[61] In Zaire Mobutu Sese Seko incited ethnic violence in the Shaba province to displace and disrupt proopposition Kasaian communities.[62]

Rather than look for additional support for this thesis, it would be better to ask what are its limitations. It is most interesting to examine a case where donor-induced democratization did not lead to large-scale privatized violence even with the emergence of an empowered and active electorate that represented a clear threat to the incumbent regime. Malawi provides an illuminating example. It demonstrates that the reliance on paramilitary organizations or militias can backfire when these informal or semiofficial forces come to rival the army, especially when the latter feels it has little stake in the survival of the incumbent regime. Furthermore, it underscores the limits to a strategy of privatized state violence in a society where ethnicity is not sufficiently militarized.

Malawi and Kenya are often cited as the severest examples of donor-induced democratization in the early 1990s. In both cases the international financial institutions did not just threaten to cut off foreign aid but actually terminated millions of dollars in aid. Many argue that without the suspension of aid from the international donors the strong one party states of Daniel Arap Moi and Hastings Banda would not have embraced multipartyism when they did. Despite the similarity in the two cases—extreme external pressure, increased protest and resistance from opposition communities and regions, and a desperate neopatrimonial ruler clinging to power—Malawi did not experience large-scale violence. In fact, unlike Kenya, the incumbent lost the election. What explains the difference in outcome?

President Hastings Kamuzu Banda, Malawi's first president, ruled for thirty years. Similar to other neopatrimonial leaders in Africa, Banda consolidated ultimate economic and political power under his personal control and employed harsh repressive practices against his critics and opponents. In 1971 the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) became the sole legal party in the country. The same year the MCP amended the constitution to allow Banda to be president for life.

Banda's brutal policies drove most opposition underground or in exile. Up until 1992 there was little domestic agitation for political reform. In March 1992, defying the country's repressive environment, Malawi's Catholic bishops distributed throughout the nation a letter highly critical of the government and its authoritarian policies. Reflecting the sentiment of mainstream Malawi, the letter roused the opposition into public action. Within a week students at the University of Malawi were protesting in support of the pastoral letter, the first public anti-Banda protests in three decades.[63]

In April 1992 Chakufwa Chihana, a trade unionist and long-time opponent of Banda, returned to Malawi from an opposition meeting in Zambia to launch a campaign to introduce multiparty politics. Upon his arrival at the airport, Chihana was immediately arrested and detained in a secret location. The calculated move by the opposition, which was announced ahead of time by foreign media, attracted interna-

tional scrutiny of Banda's desperate attempts to cling to power. As in Kenya, the Malawian opposition recognized the impressionability of the international donor community. With the donors' focus on democracy and human rights, the Malawian opposition made a concerted effort to expose publicly the Banda regime's abusive policies and resistance to democratic reforms.

During the cold war, when Malawi was a key ally of the United States in southern Africa, the western powers overlooked Banda's authoritarian rule. In the 1990s, however, with the determinants of western foreign policy in Africa shifting from containing Communism to spreading democracy and respecting human rights, external pressure steadily increased on Banda's regime. The arrest of Chihana and the subsequent crackdown of a textile worker demonstration, which sparked two days of rioting and led to forty deaths, compelled the international community to act. At a donor conference held under the auspices of the World Bank in Paris in early May 1992, the international donors agreed to suspend all nonhumanitarian aid to Banda's government for at least six months. The lenders tied the resumption of foreign assistance to evidence that the Malawian government had "taken concrete measures with respect to human rights and the democratization of political life."[64]

The suspension of aid catalyzed the opposition to increase its demands on Banda's regime. In this period, Malawi experienced an unprecedented number of strikes. In turn, the government continued to crack down on the protesters with widespread arrests. Wary of his diminishing power and recognizing the limits to repression, Banda tried to appease the international community and temper domestic opposition by introducing a referendum, granting Malawi citizens the choice between continued single party rule and multiparty politics.

Violence, intimidation, and arrests of opposition members characterized the referendum campaign. The main organs of repression were the police and the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP). President Banda established the Young Pioneers in 1963 to mobilize young people to contribute to the country's development. He eventually incorporated the MYP into the security services. Employing brutal tactics to eliminate "enemies of the Party," the MYP quickly emerged as violent enforcers of Banda's reign.[65]

During the democratic transition, MYP's paramilitary organization helped target political challengers and disrupt oppositional activities throughout the countryside. The repression, however, failed to deter Malawians from voting in favor of multipartyism in the referendum. With the adoption of multiparty politics, a presidential election was set for May 1994.

Following the referendum, the MYP continued to intimidate and harass opposition populations. Though the MYP coordinated its activities with the secret *nyau* dance cult, a traditional organization of male Chewa (Malawi's largest ethnic group), it did not instigate ethnic violence to disenfranchise and displace opposition populations.[66] The salience of regional identity in Malawi helped to moderate ethnic divi-

sions. The British organization of the country into Northern, Central, and Southern Regions in 1921 established the basis for regional identities, while differentials in development, access to education, and missionary activity helped to solidify them.[67] Banda's favoritism toward his own ethnic group, the Chewa, evidenced by his relocation of the capital from the south (a non-Chewa area) to the central part of the country (Chewa territory) and legalization of Chewa as the sole national language in 1968, exacerbated ethnic antagonisms but did not override regionalism, as the north and south continued to remain cohesive groups, each united by their political marginalization. The multiparty election in 1994 followed these regional lines, with the center of the country backing Banda and the MCP, the north supporting the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD), and the south voting for the United Democratic Front (UDF). After a careful analysis of voting data in Malawi, Deborah Kaspin concludes: "Regionalism was at least as salient as ethnicity in creating voting blocks and, given population numbers, ultimately more important in determining the outcome of the elections."[68] The regional blocs mitigated ethnic tension and provided some electoral security for groups within the blocs.

More important, regional or ethnic relations did not become militarized. Unlike in Kenya and Rwanda, whose armies became stacked with Kalenjin and Hutu, respectively, in Malawi the army remained apolitical and fairly representative, as Banda devoted most attention to the MYP and the police. The army came to resent the repressive role the MYP played, and in December 1993 it demolished the paramilitary group in order to prevent it from continuing repressive campaigns against opposition supporters.

Tension between the official army and the MYP existed for years before a violent confrontation in December 1993. The army detested Banda's favoritism toward the MYP and the supplying of arms and ammunition to it at the expense of the official forces. Moreover, Malawi's policy of dual intervention in the civil war in neighboring Mozambique strained the relationship between the two forces. Whereas the Malawi army coordinated military exercises with the Mozambican government forces, the MYP trained with RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance), the main rebel group. This contradictory policy of supporting both the government forces and the rebels in Mozambique exposed the divisions within the Malawian government between those who supported the MYP and those who supported the army.[69]

Feeling slighted by Banda's regime, the army tacitly supported the opposition movement and the calls for Banda's removal in a free and fair election. In March 1992 the army intervened to protect student demonstrators from the MYP and the police.[70] With the increase in MYP attacks on opposition supporters, the government's refusal to disarm the paramilitary group, despite endless promises, and the MYP's stockpiling of weapons throughout the country for use in the election campaign, the army sensed the urgent need to take matters into its own hands.

A gun battle between the army and members of the MYP in the northern part of the country resulted in the death of two soldiers and provided the spark for the army violently to confront the MYP. The army launched Operation *Bwezani* (Operation Return All), with the goal of neutralizing the MYP and forcing the government formally to disband the paramilitary organization. The army destroyed MYP training bases, killed tens of militia members, and forced thousands into Mozambique.

The army operation cleared the way for a peaceful election campaign in 1994. The government recognized that it could no longer use the MYP to target opposition communities and members. As Daniel Posner writes: "By stripping the MCP of its formidable instrument of repression and making clear both the army's preference for democratic change and the ease with which it could block attempts to derail it, the military's action against the MYP played a critical role in ensuring the ultimate success of the political transition."[71] Unable to disenfranchise and intimidate opposition voters, Banda lost the presidential election held on May 17, 1994. Banda's thirty-year reign came to an end, and Bakili Muzuli of the United Democratic Front became president.

In summary, the government of Hastings Banda found itself confronted by intense domestic and external demands for democratization in the early 1990s. Recognizing that costs were too high to reject democratic reforms altogether, the regime tried to counterbalance the political challenges with accommodation and repression. When Malawians voted two-to-one in favor of multipartyism over single party rule in a national referendum, Banda accepted the will of the people and called on parliament to legalize political parties for future multiparty elections. In the election campaign, the Banda regime relied on the MYP to use violence and intimidation to shore up its electoral base, while attempting to divide the opposition. However, unlike in Kenya and Rwanda, the government did not have firm control over the army. Sensing that the MYP could potentially mar the election results, the army, whose sympathies rested with the opposition rather than with the incumbent regime, intervened and demolished the paramilitary organization, paving the way for a smooth, peaceful democratic transition.

## Results

The convergence of domestic political agitation and international donor pressure increased demands on African regimes at the end of the cold war. Long-standing autocrats met these dual challenges with increased repression. In Kenya and Rwanda the governments conducted mass arrests, banned political rallies, and targeted opposition leaders. Soon, however, the two governments realized the futility of these policies, as the oppositional threat broadened. For Moi's government the Kikuyu, the

Luo, and the Luhya became collective targets because of their potential to vote Moi out of office. In Rwanda the invasion by the RPF transformed the political enemy to include the entire Tutsi population, which Habyarimana's regime viewed as potential agents for the rebel insurgency. As incumbents' perceptions of the political enemy shifted, they altered their coercive strategies to meet this new threat. In addition, western donors' low tolerance for human rights abuses further drove Kenya and Rwanda to communalize their repression tactics.

In Malawi the course of repression followed a similar path. The twin demands by international and domestic actors placed enormous pressure on President Banda. As he opened the political system, he simultaneously targeted opposition supporters. Banda, too, realized the breadth of the threat to his regime and the need to disrupt political rivals. Unlike in Kenya and Rwanda, a semiofficial organization, the Malawi Youth Pioneers, was already in place and capable of containing the dispersed oppositional threat. Ironically, it was the institutionalized nature of the MYP that motivated the autonomous Malawi army to disband it violently and ensure that its activities did not disrupt a free and fair election.

Donor-induced democratization does not preclude states from using official actors to subjugate opponents violently. Kenya before the 1992 election and Rwanda before and during the genocide relied extensively on the security, police, and army to suppress real or perceived dissident activity, especially in urban areas where governments feared that demonstrations might lead to a groundswell of support for the opposition, defections from the army, and a mass uprising. However, some states have frequently turned to nonstate actors since the end of the cold war because of their deniability (allowing governments to maintain aid flows and increase resources when faced with donor conditionalities) and expendability (allowing governments in the era of multipartyism to consume opposition communities and immobilize the new pervasive and persistent dissident threat with a versatile and camouflaged proxy). Furthermore, the use of ethnic violence played upon the international community's fears of instability and state collapse, enticing donors to increase, not decrease, aid to strengthen the government's capability to contain the spreading violence.

## Conclusion

The rise of irregulars in Kenya and Rwanda was an intentional government response to increased external conditionalities on foreign aid and to domestic threats accompanying democratization. Governments turned to militias, vigilantes, and party loyalists to counter the growing number of real or perceived political challengers with a deniable, expendable, and cheap alternative to the army, security, or police forces.

Recent events indicate that privatized state violence has remained a salient coercive strategy for some African governments beyond the years immediately following

the cold war. President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, facing stringent international pressure and a groundswell of domestic opposition during parliamentary and presidential elections in 2000 and 2002, respectively, employed militias, composed of war veterans, unemployed youths, and other irregulars, to counter the expansive threat of the popular opposition coalition and its followers.[72]

Despite the chances of all-out civil war, the irregular units' turning on the government, or state collapse, an increasing number of African leaders have risked compromising their monopoly of violence in order to win an election or stave off insurgents to preserve power for at least another few years. Unfortunately, the international community, particularly western donors, was an unwitting accomplice in driving Rwanda and Kenya to communalize their repression and turn to marauding militias and other irregulars to maintain their ever precarious privileged position. This privatizing of repression had devastating consequences for democracy and the protection of human rights, ironically the very two issues the international community felt its external conditionalities and pressure would promote.

## NOTES

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1. See Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience* (New York: Henry Holt, 1997); Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), ch. 5; John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War,'" *International Security*, 25 (Summer 2000), 43–71.

2. Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991), ch. 7; Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," in Patrick O'Meara, Howard D. Mehlinger, and Matthew Krain, eds., *Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century: A Reader* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), pp. 34–60.

3. Van Creveld, p. 192.

4. Bruce B. Campbell, "Death Squads: Definition, Problems, and Historical Context," in Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner, eds., *Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), p. 5.

5. Jeffrey Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," *International Security*, 21 (Winter 1996–1997), 120–44.

6. This article is in line with Linda Kirschke, "Informal Repression, Zero-Sum Politics and Late Third Wave Transitions," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 38 (September 2000), 383–405, on Cameroon, Rwanda, and Kenya, and the other work done by the human rights group Article 19 (see note 16). It differs from Kirschke's study by reviewing cross-national evidence, identifying limits to the thesis through the case of Malawi, and arguing that the changing nature of the opposition threat due to democratization (that is, the empowering of rural constituencies and entire communities) is a key explanatory variable of privatized state violence, or informal repression.

7. Kaldor, ch. 5.
8. Van Creveld, p. 197; Kaplan, p. 56.
9. Mueller, p. 70.
10. Kaplan, p. 56.
11. James Ron, "Varying Methods of State Violence," *International Organization*, 51 (Spring 1997), 279; Kathryn Sikkink, "Human Rights, Principled Issues-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America," *International Organization*, 47 (Summer 1993), 411–41.
12. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
13. Political conditionalities are demands by foreign donors, primarily western governments and international financial institutions, on aid recipients to reform governing practices and respect human rights or risk losing external assistance.
14. Christian Davenport, "Vs. Citizens: Discovering and Understanding Coercive State Activity" (College Park: manuscript, University of Maryland, 2002).
15. Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, "Introduction," in Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, eds., *The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Government Violence and Repression* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), p. 7.
16. This is similar to what the human rights organization, Article 19, calls "informal repression." Article 19 argues that "informal repression" emerges "[as] governments...come under increasing scrutiny, both domestically and internationally, for their human rights performance [and resort] to covert and surrogate means of repressing their opponents." See its insightful report on this phenomenon, Article 19, "Deadly Marionettes: State-Sponsored Violence in Africa" (London: International Centre Against Censorship, 1997).
17. Mark I. Lichbach, *The Rebel's Dilemma* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).
18. Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 202.
19. See Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Political Regimes and Regime Transitions in Africa, 1910–1994* (East Lansing and Ann Arbor: Michigan State University and Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1996–1997).
20. The Pearson correlation between repression and international pressure is 0.285; significance is 0.034 (one-tailed test). Most likely, the causal arrow goes both ways. Political conditionalities were placed on African governments in reaction to their human rights abuses. At the same time, international pressure induced incumbents to open their political systems, exposing them to political challengers that threatened their political survival unless repressed. The analysis was run using the repression (REPRESS) variable and international pressure (INTLPR) variable from Bratton and van de Walle, *Political Regimes and Regime Transitions in Africa*, dataset.
21. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 181–83.
22. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, "Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa," *Comparative Politics*, 24 (July 1992), 424.
23. Marina Ottaway, "Nation Building and State Disintegration," in Kidane Mengisteab and Cyril Daddieh, eds., *State Building and Democratization in Africa: Faith, Hope, and Realities* (Westport: Praeger, 1999).
24. See Andrew Moravscik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization*, 51 (Autumn 1997), 513–53.
25. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for motivating this line of thought.
26. Kikuyu is the largest ethnic group in Kenya, representing approximately 21 percent of the population. Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, was a Kikuyu. See Jennifer A. Widner, *The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From "Harambee!" to "Nyayo!"* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

27. Luo is the second largest ethnic group in Kenya, representing approximately 14 percent of the population.
28. Widner, p. 170.
29. John M. Cohen, "Foreign Aid and Ethnic Interests in Kenya," in Milton J. Esman and Ronald J. Herring, eds., *Carrot, Sticks, and Ethnic Conflict: Rethinking Development Assistance* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), p. 103.
30. The Consultative Group for Kenya included the World Bank, the United States, members of the European Union, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, and Japan. See Michael Chege, "The Return of Multiparty Politics," in Joel Barkan, ed., *Beyond Capitalism vs. Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994).
31. See "World Bank Says Future Aid to Kenya Depends on Reforms," *Associated Press*, Nov. 26, 1991.
32. Net official development assistance (ODA) in 1990 was responsible for more than 70 percent of gross domestic investment (GDI) in Kenya. World Bank, *African Development Indicators: 2001* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001).
33. President Moi is a Kalenjin, while George Saitoti, the vice president, is a Maasai. See Republic of Kenya, *Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and Other Parts of Kenya* (Nairobi: 1992); Chairman Justice A. M. Akiwumi, "Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya" (Nairobi: Daily Nation, 2002); Human Rights Watch, *Divide and Rule: State-Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), p. 11.
34. Akiwumi, "Report of the Judicial Commission.
35. "Military Assure Moi of Support," *The Independent* (London), July 11, 1990.
36. Human Rights Watch documents the role the government had in their ethnic cleansing campaign, such as transporting the irregulars in government helicopters and vehicles. See Human Rights Watch, *Divide and Rule*, pp. 19, 31.
37. The Kenyan electoral law required that the president-elect win 25 percent of the vote in a minimum of five of the country's eight provinces. See David Throup and Charles Hornsby, *Multiparty Politics in Kenya* (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), p. 249.
38. See Chairman Justice A. M. Akiwumi, "Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya, Part III: Nyanza and Western Provinces" (Nairobi: Daily Nation, 2002), p. 27.
39. John O. Oucho, *Undercurrents of Ethnic Conflict in Kenya* (Boston: Brill, 2002), p. 87.
40. Human Rights Watch, *Divide and Rule*, p. 1.
41. Commonwealth Secretariat, *The Presidential, Parliamentary and Civil Elections in Kenya*, The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, December 29, 1992, p. 40.
42. "How Not to Seek Approval," *Economist*, Apr. 24, 1993.
43. "Sinister," *Economist*, Feb. 4, 1995.
44. See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, "Kenya Ministerial Statement on Land Dispute Clashes," Nov. 8, 1991; Moi quoted in *Economic Review* (Kenya), Nov. 30, 1992, cited in Throup and Hornsby, p. 342.
45. Organizations that documented evidence of the government of Kenya's complicity with and sponsorship of the ethnic violence include the Catholic Bishops of Kenya, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the National Elections Monitoring Group (NEMU), the Kenya Human Rights Commission, the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, and a Kenyan parliamentary select committee. During the 1997 election campaign, the government of Kenya pursued a similar strategy, sponsoring violent irregulars to attack and kill civilians living in opposition strongholds. Most of the privatized state violence occurred in the Coast Province, leading to an estimated one hundred deaths and 100,000 displaced. See Human Rights Watch, *Playing with Fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence, and Human Rights in Kenya* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002).

46. Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 121.
47. Hutu Power was the ideology that guided a group of Hutus close to the president and his wife. It called for the total elimination of Tutsi from Rwandan society and politics.
48. Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), p. 3.
49. African Rights, *Rwanda: Death, Despair, and Defiance* (London: African Rights, 1994), p. 57.
50. Evidence showed that the Rwandan government and army trained the Interahamwe, provided the irregular forces with weapons and transportation, and granted the Interahamwe fighters immunity from prosecution. See Des Forges, "Warnings."
51. Timothy Longman, "State, Civil Society, and Genocide in Rwanda," in Richard Joseph, ed., *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 348–50.
52. Gerard Prunier, "The Rwandan Patriotic Front," in Christopher Clapham, ed., *African Guerrillas* (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), p. 132.
53. Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 187.
54. Des Forges, p. 124.
55. Mamdani, pp. 212–13.
56. Timothy Longman, "Rwanda: Chaos from Above," in Leonardo A. Villalon and Phillip A. Huxtable, eds., *The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 82.
57. Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families* (New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 1998), p. 94.
58. Des Forges, p. 91.
59. Clapham, *Africa and the International System*, p. 199.
60. Peter Uvin, *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda* (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1998).
61. Article 19, "South Africa."
62. U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 292–308.
63. Daniel N. Posner, "Malawi's New Dream," *Journal of Democracy*, 6 (January 1995), 137.
64. "Malawi: Creditors, Condition Aid on Democratization, Human Rights," *Inter-Press Service*, May 13, 1992.
65. Harvey J. Sindima, *Malawi's First Republic: An Economic and Political Analysis* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2002), p. 152.
66. Article 19, "Malawi."
67. Posner, p. 132.
68. Deborah Kaspin, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Malawi's Democratic Transition," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 33 (December 1995), 595–620.
69. See Kings M. Phiri, "A Case of Revolutionary Change in Contemporary Malawi: The Malawi Army and the Disarming of the Malawi Young Pioneers," *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies* (University of Zimbabwe), 1 (March 2000).
70. Richard Carver, "The Army Factor," *Africa Report*, 39 (January-February 1994), 56–58.
71. Posner, p. 142.
72. See International Crisis Group, "Zimbabwe at the Crossroads: Transition or Conflict?" (Brussels: International Crisis Group, March 2002).